Abstract. We state the basic requirements for time-stamping systems applicable as the necessary support to the legal use of electronic documents. We analyze the main drawbacks of the time-stamping systems proposed to date and present a new system that meets all the stated requirements. We prove that these requirements cannot be signi cantly tightened.
Introduction
Time-stamping HS91 , BdM91 , BHS92 is a set of techniques enabling us to ascertain whether an electronic document was created or signed at a certain time. The real importance of time-stamping becomes clear when there is a need for a legal use of electronic documents with a long lifetime. Without time-stamping we neither can trust signed documents when the cryptographic primitives used for signing have become unreliable nor solve the cases when the signer himself repudiates the signing, claiming that he has accidentally lost his signature key. During the last years, especially in the context of legal regulation of using digital signatures, the organizational and legal aspects of time-stamping itself have become the subject of world-wide attention. In addition to de ning the responsibilities of the owner of the signature, duties and responsibilities of the third party Time-Stamping Service, TSS must be stated as well. Hence, there is an increasing interest in time-stamping systems where the need to trust the TSS is minimized. In order to make users liable only for their own mistakes, there has to be a possibility to ascertain the o ender.
Unlike p h ysical objects, digital documents do not comprise the seal of time. Thus, the association of an electronic document uniquely with a certain moment of time is very complicated, if not impossible. Even by the theory of relativity, n o absolute time exists. The best we can achieve with time-stamping is the relative temporal authentication RTA based on the complexity-theoretic assumption on the existence of collision-resistant one-way hash functions. RTA enables the veri er given two time-stamped documents to verify which o f t h e t wo w as created earlier.
The main drawbacks of the time-stamping systems proposed to date concern 1 the need to unconditionally trust the TSS and 2 the time-complexity of RTA, which is linear on the number of issued time-stamps.
In the current paper theoretical and practical requirements are discussed and a new time-stamping system is presented 1 in which the need to trust the TSS is signi cantly diminished and 2 which o ers RTA with the complexity proportional to the logarithm of the number of issued time-stamps.
In Sect. 2 the time-stamping solutions proposed to date are analyzed. Sect. 3 clari es the security objectives of time-stamping by giving essential requirements to the time-stamping systems. In Sect. 4 the protocols of the new time-stamping system are described using the linear linking scheme. In Sect. 5 binary linking schemes are introduced and a scheme with logarithmic verifying time is presented. In Sect. 6 we prove t h a t the requirements stated in Sect. 3 cannot be tightened.
Existing Time-Stamping Systems
By a simple time-stamping protocol HS91 , Sect. 4, the TSS appends the current time t to the submitted document X, signs the composite document t; X and returns the two values t and s = sig TSS t; X to the client. The weaknesses of this scheme are the unreliability of old time-stamps after a possible leakage of the signature key of the TSS and the impossibility o f v erifying whether s was issued actually at time t stated in the time-stamp, implying that the TSS has to be u n c onditionally trusted. Because of these drawbacks it has been widely accepted that a secure time-stamping system cannot rely solely on keys or on any other secret information. An overview of the existing time-stamping solutions is given in MQ97 .
Linear Linking Scheme LLS
In order to diminish the need for trust, the users may demand that the TSS links all time-stamps together into a chain using a collision-resistant hash function H as was proposed in HS91 , Sect. 5.1 variant 1. In this case the time-stamp for the n-th submitted document X n is s = s i g T S S n; t n ; ID n ; X n ; L n ; where t n is the current time, ID n is the identi er of the submitter and L n is the linking information de ned by the recursive equation L n := t n,1 ; ID n,1 ; X n,1 ; H L n,1 :
There are several complications with the practical implementation of this scheme. At rst, the number of steps needed to verify the one-way relationship between two time-stamps is linear with respect to the number of time-stamps between them. Hence, a single veri cation may be as costly as it was to create the whole chain. This solution has impractical trust and broadcast requirements, as it was pointed out already in BdM91 . A modi cation was proposed in HS91 Sect. 5.1, variant 2 where every time-stamp is linked with k 1 time-stamps directly preceding it. This variation decreases the requirements for broadcast by increasing the space needed to store individual time-stamps.
Tree-Like S c hemes
Two similar tree-like schemes have been proposed BdM91, BHS92 . In the Haber-Stornetta scheme BHS92, HS97 , the time-stamping procedure is divided into rounds. The time-stamp R r for round r is a cumulative hash of the timestamp R r,1 for round r , 1 and of all the documents submitted to the TSS during the round r. After the end of the r-th round a binary tree T r is built. Every participant P i who wants to time-stamp at least one document in this round, submits to the TSS a hash y r;i which is a hash of R r,1 and of all the documents he wants to time-stamp in this round. The leafs of T r are labeled by di erent y r;i . Each inner node k of T r is recursively labeled by H k := HH k L ; H k R , where k L and k R are correspondingly the left and the right c hild nodes of k, and H is a collision-resistant hash function. The TSS has to store only the time-stamps R r for rounds Fig. 1 . All the remaining information, required to verify whether a certain document w as time-stamped during a xed round, is included into the individual time-stamp of the document. For example, the individual time-stamp for y r;3 is r; y r;4 ; L; H 4 ; R . The verifying procedure of the time-stamp of y r;3 consists of verifying the equality R r = HHH 4 ; H y r;3 ; y r;4 ; R r,1 . Here, the size of a single time-stamp is logarithmic with respect to the number of participants submitting their documents to the TSS for the current round.
The Haber Stornetta linking scheme BHS92, HS97 di ers slightly from the Benaloh de Mare scheme BdM91 . Here, the time-stamp R n for the n-th round is linked directly to R n,1 , enabling the veri er to check one-way dependencies between R i without examining the individual time-stamps of the submitted documents. This is impossible in the Benaloh de Mare scheme. However, in the Haber Stornetta scheme the individual time-stamps in the n-th round are not linked to the time-stamp R n,1 for previous round.
These schemes are feasible but provide the RTA for the documents issued during the same round only if we unconditionally trust the TSS to maintain the order of time-stamps in T r . Therefore, this method either increases the need for trust or otherwise limits the maximum temporal duration of rounds to the insigni cant units of time one second in Digital Notary system. However, if the number of submitted documents during a round is too small, the expenses of time-stamping a single document m a y become unreasonably large Sect. 3.3.
Security Objectives
In the following we g i v e a de nition of time-stamping systems applicable in legal situations. Later we will justify our approach and compare it to older systems.
A time-stamping system consists of a set of principals with the time-stamping server TSS together with a triple S; V; A of protocols. The stamping protocol S allows each participant to post a message. The veri cation protocol V is used by a principal having two time-stamps to verify the temporal order between those time-stamps. The audit protocol A is used by a principal to verify whether the TSS carries out his duties. Additionally, no principal in particular, TSS should be able to produce fake time-stamps without being caught. A time-stamping system has to be able to handle time-stamps which are anonymous and do not reveal any information about the content of the stamped data. The TSS is not required to identify the initiators of time-stamping requests.
Our notion of time-stamping system di ers from the one given in, e.g., BdM91 b y s e v eral important aspects. Below w e motivate the di erences.
Relative T emporal Authentication
The main security objective of time-stamping is temporal authentication Jus98 ability t o p r o ve that a certain document has been created at a certain moment o f time. Although the creation of a digital data item is an observable event i n t h e physical world, the moment of its creation cannot be ascertained by observing the data itself moreover, no such thing as the absolute thing exists. The best one can do is to check the relative temporal order of the created data items i.e., prove the RTA using one-way dependencies de ning the arrow of time, analogous to the way in which the growth of entropy de nes the arrow of time in the physical world Haw88 , Chap. 9. For example, if H is a collision-resistant one-way hash function, one can reliably use the following rough" derivation rule: if HX a n d X are known to a principal P at a moment t, then someone possibly P himself used X to compute HX a t a m o m e n t prior to t. T o date, the existence of one-way functions has not been proved. Therefore, the proposed time-stamping systems make sense only under the hypothesis of the existence of collision free one-way hash functions.
De nition 1. A collision-resistant one-way hash function MOV96 , Sect. 9.2 is a function H which has the properties of compression, ease of computation, preimage resistance, 2nd-preimage resistance and collision resistance.
De nition 2. Let be a binary relation on IN, such that x y implies x y and H be a c ollision-resistant one-way hash function. A ; H-linking scheme is a procedure to link a family H n of data items together using auxiliary linking items L n satisfying the recursive formula L n := HH n ; L n1 ; : : : ; L n ,1 n ; 1 where n 1 n ,1 n are exactly the elements of ,1 n : = fm j m n g the preimage of n by . A sequence m i ì =1 , where m i m i+1 , is called a verifying chain between m 1 and m`with length`. In the context of time-stamping H n = Hn; X n , where X n denotes the n-th time-stamped document. The linking item L n is also referred to as a time-stamp of X n . Note that a one-way relationship between L n and L m n m d o e s n o t prove that in the moment of creating X n the bit-string X m did not exist. All we know is that X n did exist at the moment of creating L m .
We h a ve omitted the t n in the formula for H n , whereas it should not be taken for granted that the value t n indeed represents the submission time of X n . T h e only way for a principal to associate a time-stamp with a certain moment o f t i m e is to time-stamp a nonce at this moment. By a nonce we mean a su ciently long random bit-string, such that the probability it has been already time-stamped is negligible. In order to verify the absolute creating time of a document timestamped by another principal, the veri er has to compare the time-stamp with the time-stamps of nonces generated by t h e v eri er herself. In this solution there are neither supplementary duties to the TSS nor to the other principals. The use of nonces illustrates the similarity b e t ween time-stamping and ordinary authentication protocols, where nonces are used to prevent the possible reuse of old messages from previous communications. By using RTA it is possible to determine not only the submitting time of the signature but also the time of signing the document. Before signing a document X the principal P generates a nonce N and time-stamps it. He then includes the time-stamp LN of N to the document, signs it and obtains the time-stamp L of the signature = s i g P LN; X . From the view-point of the TSS these stamping events are identical he need not be aware whether he is time-stamping a nonce or meaningful data. For the veri cation of the document X, the veri er has to compare both these time-stamps with the time-stamps trusted by her.
As there are one-way dependencies between LN, and L t h e v eri er may conclude that the signature was created in the time-frame between the moments of issuance of LN a n d o f L respectively. If these moments are close enough, the signing time can be ascertained with necessary precision.
Detection of Forgeries
A time-stamping system must have properties enabling users to verify whether an arbitrary time-stamp is correct or not. Possession of two documents with corresponding time-stamps is not enough to prove t h e R TA b e t ween the documents because everyone is able to produce fake c hains of time-stamps.
A time-stamping system should allow 1 to determine whether the timestamps possessed by an individual have been tampered with; and 2 in the case of tampering, to determine whether the time-stamps were tampered by the TSS or tampered after the issuing generally by unknown means. In the second case, there is no-one to bring an action against. The principals interested in legal use of time-stamps should themselves verify their correctness immediately after the issuing using signatures and other techniques discussed later because if the signature of the TSS becomes unreliable, the signed time-stamps cannot be used as an evidence. In order to increase the trustworthiness of the time-stamping services it should be possible for the clients to periodically inspect the TSS. Also, in the case when the TSS is not guilty he should have a mechanism to prove his innocence, i.e., that he has not issued a certain time-stamp during a certain round.
Additionally, the TSS must publish regularly, i n a n authenticated manner, the time-stamps for rounds BdM91 in mass media. If the time-stamping protocol includes by using collision-resistant one-way hash functions 1 the message digest of any time-stamp issued during the r-th round into the time-stamp for r-th round, and 2 the message digest of the time-stamp for round r , 1 i n to any time-stamp issued during the r-th round, it will be intractable for anyone to undetectably forge a time-stamp. The forgery detection procedures should be simple. Forgeries should be determinable either during the stamping protocol when the time-stamp, signed by the TSS, fails to be correct or later when it is unable to establish the temporal order between two otherwise correct timestamps see Sect. 4 for details.
Feasibility Requirements
The time-stamping systems of BdM91 and HS97 use nonlinear partial ordering of time-stamps and therefore do not support the RTA. Sect. 4 shows how t o modify the linear linking scheme HS91 , Sect. 5.1 to ful ll the security objectives RTA and detection of forgeries. On the other hand, in practice, in this scheme the detection of forgeries would take too many steps. As noted in Jus98 , it is easy to forge time-stamps when we can assume that the veri er has limited computational power. This leads us to the question of feasibility. In order to make R TA feasible in the case when time-stamps belong to di erent rounds, it is reasonable to de ne an additional layer of links between the time-stamps for rounds.
De nition 3. Assume we are given ; H and ; H linking schemes and a monotonically increasing function : I N ! IN. By a ; ; ; H -linking scheme we mean a procedure for linking a family H n of data items together using auxiliary linking items L n and L r satisfying the recursive formulae L n := HH n ; L n1 ; : : : ; L n ,1 n if n 6 2 IN L r := L r = HH r ; L r1 ; : : : ; L r ,1 r H r := HH m ; L m1 ; : : : ; L m ,1 n ; where m = r, ,1 n = fm 1 ; : : : ; m ,1 n g m 1 ::: m ,1 n and ,1 r = fr 1 ; : : : ; r ,1 r g r 1 : : : r ,1 r .
The values L r are also referred to as the time-stamps for rounds. Note that the time-stamps requested from the TSS during the veri cation protocol should belong to the set of time-stamps for rounds because only these time-stamps are available in the time-stamping server.
De nition 4. A ; ; ; H -linking scheme is said to be a n Accumulated Linking Scheme ALS with rank m, i f 1. If r n r + 1 then ,1 n r; r + 1 IN; 2. r + 1 , r m. We say that a ; H-linking scheme enables accumulated time-stamping if for arbitrary positive m there exists , such that the ; ; ; H-scheme is an ALS with rank m.
If the linking scheme used enables accumulated time-stamping, the duration of the rounds can be exibly enlarged in order to guarantee that only a negligible fraction of the time-stamps are kept in the memory of the time-stamping server.
Let n be the total number of time-stamps issued till the moment of the current run of stamping veri cation protocol. The feasibility requirements can be summarized with the following:
1. The number of the evaluations of the hash function during the veri cation protocol should be Olog n. In particular, the number of time-stamps examined during a single run of the veri cation protocol should be Olog n;
2. There should be a conveniently small upper bound to the length of rounds, whereas the clients want to get their time-stamps in reasonable time. It seems to be sensible to require that the stamping protocol of the n-th document must terminate before the TSS has received additional Olog n time-stamp requests. In real applications it is desirable for the average length of rounds to be constant this would guarantee that for an arbitrary constant c there would be only negligible fraction of rounds with length greater than c.
3. The size of an individual time-stamp should be small. As we will show later Thm. 2, there is a trade-o between these quantities. In Sect. 5 and the following sections we present an improvement of the scheme of Sect. 4.
First Version of Our System: Linear Linking
For pedagogical reasons, we outline the protocols and the basic organizational principles of our system using the linear linking scheme. This scheme ful lls all the trust requirements but is impractical. Further, the described scheme is signi cantly improved by replacing the linear scheme with a binary linking scheme.
Let the number M of time-stamps per round be a constant known to the participants clients and all the data items X n be of xed size. Therefore, in the case of the linear linking scheme, the time-stamp for the r-th round has a number r = M r.
Role of the TSS
The TSS maintains the following three databases:
1. the database D c of the time-stamps of the current round. 2. the database D p of the time-stamps of the previous round. 3. the database D r of the time-stamps for rounds.
These databases are considered to be on-line in the sense that any client can make requests into them at any moment. The fourth database the complete data-base of time-stamps is also stored but not on-line it may be stored into an archive of CD-s. Requests to this database are possible, but costly e.g., requiring human interaction. After the end of each round, the time-stamps in D p are stored to a separate CD this process may be audited. Thereafter, D p is emptied. The time-stamp R r for the current round is computed, added to D r and published in a newspaper two processes which should be audited. The database D c is copied into D p and a new database D c is created.
Stamping Protocol
Suppose, the current r o u n d n umberisr.
1. Client sends X n to the TSS. 2. The TSS nds H n = Hn; X n and L n = H n ; L n,1 , and adds the pair H n ; L n t o D c .
3. The TSS signs the pair n; L n a n d s e n d s n; L n ; sig TSS n; L n back t o t h e client.
4. The TSS sends the tuple headn = H n,1 ; H n,2 ; : : : ; H r,1+1 to the client. De nition 5. The complete individual time-stamp s n for the n-th document is s n := tailn; headn; n ; L n ; sig TSS n; L n :
Every client who is interested in the legal use of a time-stamp, should validate it during the stamping protocol. In a relatively short period between the 1st and the 3rd step and between the 4th and 6th step, the signature key of TSS is trusted to authenticate him and therefore, his signature on an invalid headn or tailn can be used as an evidence in the court. But the client is responsible for doing it when the signature key of TSS can still be trusted. Later, the signature of TSS may become unreliable and therefore only the one-way properties can be used.
Veri cation Protocol
Let rn denote the round where s n was issued. Assume, the veri er has two time-stamped documents X m ; s m and X n ; s n where m n .
1. The veri er checks the validity of the equations 2 and 3 for both timestamps.
2. If rm = rn then the data hold in tailm and headn will be enough to check whether L n = HH n ; H H n,1 ; : : : H H m+1 ; L m : : : : 3. If rm r n, the veri er sends a request to the TSS. 
Audit Protocol
Because of the possible legal importance of the time-stamps issued by the TSS, there should be some mechanism to audit TSS. One easy way to do it is to periodically ask time-stamps from the TSS and verify them. If these time-stamps are linked inconsistently i.e., the Eq. 2 and 3 hold for both time-stamps but the veri cation protocol fails, the TSS can be proven to be guilty. Also, there has to be a mechanism for the TSS to prove that he has not issued a certain time-stamp S in a certain round r. This can be done if the TSS presents all the time-stamps issued during the r-th round, shows that S is not among them and that the time-stamp for the r-th round, found by using these time-stamps and the linking rules, coincides with the published time-stamp.
Binary Linking Schemes
In the current section we g i v e a construction of a practical linking scheme with logarithmic upper bound to the length of the shortest verifying chain between any t wo time-stamps.
De nition 6. Let f and g be functions from IN to IN satisfying the condition fn gn n for any n. A f;g;H,binary linking scheme BLS is a ; Hlinking scheme where for any n, ,1 n = ffn; g ng. I n o r der to guarantee the existence of a verifying chain between arbitrary x and y, we have to take gn : = n , 1. In those cases we omit n , 1 and talk just about a f;H-BLS.
A binary linking scheme can alternatively be de ned as a directed countable graph which is connected, contains no cycles and where all the vertices have t wo outgoing edges links. Let us construct an in nite family of such graphs T k in the following way:
1. T 1 consists of a single vertex which is labeled with the number1.Thisvertex is both the source and the sink of the graph T 1 .
2. Let T k be already constructed. Its sink is labeled by 2 k , 1. The graph T k+1
consists of two copies of T k , where the sink of the second copy is linked to the source of the rst copy, and an additional vertex labeled by 2 k+1 , 1 which is linked to the source of the second copy. Labels of the second copy are increased by 2 k , 1. The sink of T k+1 is equal to the sink of the rst copy, the source of T k+1 is equal to the vertex labeled by 2 k+1 , 1.
Thereafter, link all the vertices of the second copy which h a ve less than two outgoing links, to the source of the rst copy. Note that there is now a double link from the sink of the second copy to the source of the rst copy. In Sect. 4 we presented an outline of a time-stamping system that ful lls our trust requirements. In the next we show how to make this system feasible by using a BLS.
In order to issue the individual time-stamp for the n-th document, the TSS has to nd the shortest verifying chains between rn,1 and n and between n and rn . The n- The maximum length of rounds grows proportionally to Olog n. However, the average length of rounds is constant and therefore it is practical to publish the time-stamps for rounds after constant units of time. This can be achieved easily with the following procedure. If the deadline" for round is approaching and there are still q time-stamps not issued yet, assign random values to the remaining data items H n . Remark 1. Denote by ord n the greatest power of 2 dividing n. In the ALS presented above, it is reasonable to label time-stamps in the lexicographical order with pairs n; p, where 0 p ord n and n 0. Then, fn; p : = 0; p ; n = 2 p n , 2 p ; ord n , 2 p ; otherwise and gn; p : = n; p , 1 if p 0 a n d gn; 0 := n , 1; ord n , 1. Also, the formulas of i will simplify: in this case, i : = 2 k,1 i; k , 1 + ord i, for i 1.
It is easy to show that for each n and m the shortest verifying chain between n and m is uniquely de ned. The data v mn necessary to verify the one-way dependence is computed by the procedure TSDatam; n: 
Optimality
Our solution meets asymptotically the feasibility requirements, but could these requirements be re ned? Mostly not, an insight i n to this is given below. Namely, we show that for any linking scheme there does not exist a time-stamping solution where 1 the length of the time-stamps is Olog n, 2 for any m and n there exists a verifying chain between m and n with the length Olog n t h a t i s completely contained in the union Sm Sn of the corresponding individual time-stamps and 3 the stamping protocol will end in a logarithmic time.
We prove this under the assumptions 1 that an individual time-stamp is a subset of IN and 2 that the size of a time-stamp is proportional to the size 3. For any n, maxfSng , n c 2 log n for some constant c 2 .
Proof. Assume that there exists such S. Let n be a su ciently large positive integer. For a m 2 IN let m := m; m + dc 2 log me . The intervals 1 + ic 2 log n, i 2 0, : : : , b n,c2 log n,2 c2 log n c do not intersect. Let m n , c 2 log n , 1. In this case dm + c 2 log me n . As the set Sm Sn contains a -chain from m to n there should exist such m 1 2 m and n 1 2 S n on this chain that m 1 n 1 . Thus, for every m n , c 2 log n , 1 the set m ,1 Sn is nonempty. Hence, the set ,1 Sn has at least b n,c2 log n,2 c2 log n c=n= log n elements. A contradiction with Condition 1. u t
The Thm. 2 can be straightforwardly generalized to claim that the number of examined time-stamps must be greater than any xed constant.
